Employment Relations In France Economics Essay

Employment Relations In France Economics Essay at bottom Europe France is known for its exceptional employment dealing. The french employment dealings atomic bite 18 characterised by rather low hygienic-disposed dialogue and a great pr nonethelesstives of the state. This paper will closely look at the kindly actors and their fictional character by putting wildnesson corpo measure dicker and its development since mid-eighties. The study trends with special attention to the Aubrey Laws will conclude the overview.France OverviewWith a current nation of 64,7 million (INSEE, 2010), France belongs to the nearly modern countries in the ground and to the leaders among European countries (CIA World Factbook). agree to EIROnline (2007), cut GDP growth, inflation, productivity growth, and the unemployment rate do non substantially differ from EU av periodges, as indicated in Table 1.Table 1 Facts FiguresSource EIROnline, 2007The economy in France, which traditionally has been characterised by considerable political sympathies ownership and state handling (dirigeisme), is shifting towards a mart-driven economy (CIA World Factbook). Although the state is s savings bank resign in sectors such as designer, public transport, and telecommunication, it has privatised many large companies. With the era of rigueur (rigour) the presidency extensively holdd itself from economic incumbrance. Though dirigisme slumpd, France is fifty-fifty so typified as a state-dominated economy (Jenkins, 2000), curiously in the delve market.The political environment in France has been characterised by volatility which changed with the inception of the Fifth Republic in 1958 (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004). From 1958 to 1981 the right on took the reins, while in 1981 the genialist dominance under Franois Mitterrand took over which resulted in period of instability (Knapp and Wright, 2006, p. 254). Governments of the right and unexpended go by dint of a rotative period, with a temporary cohabitation (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004). In 1995 Franois Mitterrand turned over the reins to Jacques Chirac, a right president, who lasted till 2007. His successor, Nicolas Sarkozy from the right governing body is the current President of France.Employment Relations in FranceEmployment semblances in France are highly influenced by the demographics as well as the legal and political environment of the country (Cerdin and Peretti, 2001). fit to the subject area Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE, 2010), the employment rate for the convey population in 2008 accounted for about 28 million, acting to 56,2 percent of active pot above 15 years. Whereas the unemployment rate in France amounted for 7,8 percent in 2008 which correspond to 2.1 million people. The young people (15 to 24 years-old) are representing the majority of the inert with about 19 percent (in 2008). Generally, the young people are to the highest degree sensitive to t he economic fluctuation of the employment market. The advertize market date rate of the 15 to 24-years old is declining due to the trend towards longer teaching (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004, p. 177).France has to a greater extent women in plough force than EU average (Brewster et al., 2004). The womanish labour market participation has risen from 37 percent in 1963 (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004, p. 176) to almost 52 percent in 2008 (INSEE, 2009).Within Europe, France is characterised by an change magnitude age of the work population. While the proportion of the people in the midst of 20 and 59 years decreases, the population proportion of under 20-year-old and above 60-year-old grows. both factors are responsible for this peculiarity the post-war population explosion as well as the collapse of the birth rate from 1930 to 1945 (Cerdin and Peretti, 2001). In 2008, 83 percent of the working population was between the ages of 25 and 54 (INSEE, 2009). These numbers potbelly be exp lained by the delayed entrance of the young in the labour market and early hideaway due to an step-upd early retirement policies since 1974 and the holdation of retirement at age 60 in 1982. kick upstairs distinctive characteristic of the cut employment relations is its elitism. Barsoux and Lawrence (1997, p. 11) admit that France is a society characterised by a unitary elite. Complementary, Jackson (2002, p. 38) describes the educational scheme in France as being inegalitarian, discriminatory, and exclusive. The highest aim of the education trunk is encompassed in the so-called grandes coles. The grandes coles, where managers are typically fireed from, typify an essential indication for a high potential which is regarded to a greater extent important than the actual personal potential. Managers produce part of a affable elite, called cadre. Management itself is perceived to a greater extent as a state of being in France and its development is related to the fond and hist orical context (Beardwell and Claydon, 2007).The influence of the state on employment relations in France is considerable. EIROnline (2007) describes France as being known for its dirigiste type of economy or state-managed capitalism. Employment relation in France were non tho influenced by the predominance of the state but also by the imbalance between labour characterised by much revolutionary socialists and employers being typified by paternalistic of extreme right-winger views (Traxler and Huerner, 2007).Unions and Employee RepresentationWithin Europe, France has two distinctive features although it has the majority of c oncern hearts, its rank rate is the lowest among the European countries (EUROnline, 2007 Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000). Trade vocalisation coverage is high in large enterprises than in small companies with highest coverage rate in the public sector. Sector or branch take aims are the most parking area levels of trade colligation organisation (EIROnl ine, 2007). cut trade compact, former(a) than union in rest of the European countries, do non offer corporal services to its members, which partly may explain the low membership rate as well as the lack of need to earn from a membership (Brewster et al., 2004).There are five major deterrent example union confede rations and employers are obliged to recognise them in case of at to the lowest degree atomic number 53 employee being an official representative of one of them (Scho, 2008). The five unions, which are considered representative at national level, regardless(prenominal) of the size of their membership, are summarised in the table below.Table 2 Trade UnionsSource EUROnline, 2007All contracts met by the representative unions were for a long period considered licitly emergenceive. This fact permitted employers to legally implement an agreement even if it has been signed by just one minority union (Brewster et al., 2004). The Fillon Law of 2004 however widened the scop e of this majority principle. french union show a bring forward characteristic uncommon in Europe. Especially SMEs, who usually deplete no union representativeness, make purpose of the so-called mandating surgical procedure. Introduced in October 1995 by a trine-year national multi-sector agreement, the honor especially aimed to encourage negotiations of small and non-union union agreements (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004). The purpose behind the involvement of non-representatives was to increase the typically low membership rate of French unions. For instance, about third of joint agreement ac caller-uping the 35-hour-week fair play application were signed by mandated workers (Pedersini, 2010).Employees representation in French companies has rather a complex coordinate and is incorporated in several representative bodies at the enterprise level (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004). The four major fakers areTable 2 Employee Representationwork force delegates (dlgus du personnel)Workfo rce delegates are mandatory for companies with 10 or to a greater extent employees. Elected by all employees, the delegates are representatives of employees for soulfulness or incarnate concern to the management.Work council (comit dentreprise)Work council is mandatory for companies with 50 or more employees. Elected by all employees and representatives of trade unions, the council has a consultative role about the decisions of the employer. Furthermore, it is concerns with allocating notes for social and cultural facilities for employees. study Health and Safety committee (Comit dHygine, de Scurit, et des Conditions de Travail)The committee is imperious for all companies with more than 50 employees. It includes head of the company plus employee representatives and has a consultative role about working conditions.Trade union delegates each representative union is addicted the right for a delegate in a company with at least 50 employees who besides representing their unions als o represent employees.Source Brewster et al, 2004Federations of EmployersEmployer representation stands in sharp contrast to the employee representation. Indeed, three out of four employers are represented in an employer organisation (EUROnline, 2007). The major association is the MEDEF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France), former CNPF (Conseil National du Patronat Franais). It has a multi-layered structure consisting of mixed sectoral and territorial organisations (Traxler and Huerner, 2007). MEDEF, founded in 1998, brings together all companies with at least 10 employees. contempt this official purpose, MEDEF also includes several littler companies. It directly organises 87 federations that cover about 600 associations and 165 regional organisations (EUROnline, 2007). The membership in MEDEF is cover by about 750,000 companies and 15 million employees from all sectors except land and trusted service professions (Traxler and Huerner, 2007).The SMEs are represented by the CGPME (Confdration gnrale du patronat des petites et moyennes entreprises), and self-employed artisans by the UPA (Union Professionnelle Artisanale) (EUROnline, 2007).The put upThe French state is non merely a major player in employment relations but also plays an essential role as an employer. As already mentioned, despite some privatisations, the government as yet cadaver prevailing in some sectors.Furthermore, Ruysseveldt et al. (1995) stresses that French state is typified for having its intervention in employment relations which are typically subject of corporal bargain by incorporating these reveals in police force. The intervention of the state is for instance given through the requirement for company-level negotiations, legal extension of incorporated agreements, and determination of tokenish wage. Therefore, almost 90 percent of employees are covered by agreements securing at least start limit standards, despite the low union membership and a decentralized bargain sy stem (Ebbinghaus, 2004). For instance, the stripped-down wage (SMIC), a cross-sector minimum wage, is defined by commandment, involving all employees. incarnate talk hurt is also use to set branch-level minimum wages which however, are usually lower than the SMIC (EIROnline, 2007).Finally, the French state played an important role in the development of French employment relations as demonstrated in the following chapters. incorporated Bargaining and Employee ParticipationCollective agreement forms an important part of negotiations between the law and the individual work contracts. Within Europe, France distinguishes itself from other countries by not attributing collective agreement as a central element of employment relations (Traxler and Huerner, 2007). The characteristics of the talk terms system have been extensively shaped by successive pieces of legislation (Goetschy, 1998, p. 358) and thus intensive state intervention. Collective agreements boldness further obstacles. Traxler and Huerner (2007, p.126) point out that there is a lack of shared identity among the unions and the employees who do not feel bound by the decisions taken by the representative unions. Andolfatto and Labb (2006) observe a similar dilemma for the employers and the associations. According to Schmidt (2006, p.121) policies are designed without the systematic input from societal actors, but actors are subsequently accommodated in a rather flexible implementation process, often based on derogation from the law.The negotiate structure in France is pyramidic and statute law is decisive. After the abolishment of the favourability principle (principe de faveur), decentralised levels are given autonomy on certain materialisations as long as the law is respected (plancher legal) (Euronline, 2007). National-level agreements are less frequently used than lower level agreements. Company-levels negotiations gained on importance in the field of wages and working hours which was furt her encouraged by the Fillion Law (2004) and Aubrey Law (1998/2000/2002).Development since 1980sBefore 1980s, employment relations in France were characterised by ideological oppositeness between the revolutionary labour becomement and collective dicker-aversive employers (Hoang Ngoc and Lallement, 1994) and collective negotiate particularly took place on the industry level (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004). The 1980s brought a significant move towards decentralisation with a mixerists government that checked collective bargaining in terms of politics and laws. Throughout the 1980s divers(a) company-level institutions and practices evolved which enabled negotiation of economic reforms and which tried to limit private sector industrial conflicts (Howell, 2006). The reforms were accompanied by a state intervention that sought to support work flexibility negotiations. Although the state experienced varying governments ( go away and Right), it pursued tolerable objectives which unde rlying strategy was to create legal obligations inside companies to establish independent social dialogues which again lead to a de regularization of the labour market. bingle of the major legislation pieces of the 1980s was the Auroux Report (1981) which contributed principal(prenominal)ly to a higher(prenominal) involvement of employees into the company and sought to bring unions and companies closer together (Hoang Ngoc and Lallement, 1994). counseling on collective bargaining as a keystone in the reform, Auroux created an obligations for employers and unions for regular negotiations at industry as well as company level (Eaton, 2000). This reform introduced more balance between the state and collective bargaining as it put more emphasis on bargaining than on the law itself (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004). In 1987 collective bargaining do further steps towards decentralisation. From then on company-level negotiations were freed from any linkage with a sectoral agreement, and annua lisation and more flexible opening was allowed without trim working hours.In the 1990s multi-industry bargaining gained on importance after its decline during the 70s and 80s. It was supported by government, as well as employers (by CNPF) and unions (by CFDT) who were aiming at a consensus approach towards the modernisation of French companies (Howell, 2006). Enormous emphasis of multi-industry bargaining was put on the training that became a mandatory part of collective bargaining (Goetschy and Jobert, 2004). Further significant issue throughout the 1990s was the restructuring of the employee representation within the enterprise. According to Howell (2006, p.169) French companies experienced transformations that had the effect of deepening and broadening the construction of a set of firm-level institutions that regularised social dialogue with largely non-union employee representatives. Worth mentioning is also the agreement on the articulation of bargaining levels and the possibi lity of negotiations in companies without union representatives (1995) which brought two main transformations for collective bargaining. First, the hierarchical level of the three bargaining levels (multi-industry, industry, company) became more complementary. Second, the absence of union delegate gave the elected employee representative and the employees mandated by unions the authority to sign company agreements.Again in 2000s employment relations development signalised the trend towards more decentralised collective bargaining and a state which exercised restraint in the social dialogue of the labour market. This intention was implemented through the Gnisson Law (2001) which made bargaining on equality overbearing at company level (annually) and sectoral level (every three years) (Gregory and Milner, 2009). The 2003 Fillon law encouraged the move towards company-level negotiation about wages and winced working time by accepting derogation agreements. In July 2008 new law on soc ial democracy and working time reform set new measures for the representativeness of trade unions, especially by removing the irrefragable presumption of representativeness and making representativeness dependent on the results of the workplace elections (Boulon, 2008).Concluding, the last decades were characterised by various developments in French industrial relations. Despite frequent changes of government, France has experienced a high degree of consistency in the direction of employment relations reforms (Howell, 2006). High level collective bargaining shifted towards more decentralisation aiming more at the company-level while the labour market and workplace experienced greater flexibility. Nevertheless, these developments were not simply accompanied by the distancing of the state from industrial relations, leaving the field to labour and unions. On the contrary, providing the social actors with company-level bargaining and agreements, developments were initiated and controlle d by the state. Self-sustaining bargaining never took place (Lallement and Mriaux, 2003). Thus the state reforms were button up shaping the areas of social relations. Finally, Jefferys (2003, p. 128) states the state remains at the heart of the organisation of relations between capital and French labour.Major Trends in Employment RelationsThe Aubrey LawFrance faced the most bargaining activity over working time reduction in the late 1990s and early 2000s, driven by legislation reducing the working week from 39 to 35 hours. The so-called Aubrey law, named after Martine Aubry (minister who introduced the legislation), was the sixth law in seventeen years which has an impact on the working time (Jefferys, 2000). The 35-hour week was the flagship policy of Socialist Jospins (1997-2002) plural-left coalition government (Hayden, 2006, p. 505). The main purpose of the law implicated the reduction of the working time from 39 to 35 hours by offering financial incentives to companies that u sed collective agreements for the population and protection of jobs while reducing the working time (Jefferys, 2000). Using this law, the government also had the ambition to encourage the social partners to participate more actively in the law-making process (Jefferys, 2000).The legislation which began with a framework law in 1998 resulted in a three-steps process (Levy, 2006) the first law introduced in 1998 provided the terms for voluntary work time agreements in 2000, a second Aubrey law made work time reduction mandatory for companies who failed to reach agreements employing 20 or more workers the third law, for 2002, which aimed at extension of this legislation to smaller firms, failed when the Left was replaced by the new conservative government.First Aubrey Law (1998/1999)Aubrey I introduced a variety of ways for the reduction of working time, including annualisation of hours, extended vacation periods, and a shorter working week. The companies were given increased flexibili ty in the world of work time with the essential requirement for collective bargaining (Supiot, 2001, p. 92). Social costs reliefs were promised to those companies that quickly negotiated the reduction in working hours and created or carry on jobs. Nevertheless, the collective agreements reached under Aubrey I turn up that employers put special emphasis on the flexibility in work time reduction left to them rather than on the incentives linked to the implementation (Levy, 2006).The 1999 law addressed the issue of trade union representativeness (Jefferys, 2000). From then on the social costs reliefs were only made available to those agreements met by union representing the majority of the work-force. Minority agreements were only accepted if ratified by entire work-force referendum, nevertheless the benefits of the reduced charges were not forwarded to these agreements (Howell, 2006). Smaller firms that lack a representation of unions could benefit from the legislation through the mandating process allowing them to sign company-level agreements. Without the mandating procedure agreements became legal with the confirmation of a majority of employees and local labour-business commission.Second Aubrey Law (2000)On 19th of January 2000, the Aubrey II came into effect reducing the working week from 39 to 35 hours for all enterprises with more than 20 employees. Due to the high attention paid to the flexibility in the implementation of work-time reduction, the second law provided more innovations in this area still with the prerequisite of a collective agreement. The lack of collective agreement meant less flexibility in options for work time reduction. According to Howell (2006)without a collective agreement, the reduction in work time had to be on a monthly or weekly basis, but with an agreement there were a range of other options, including annualisation, a wage increase offset against extra time, supererogatory days off and so on. (p. 148)The law therefore aim ed at the boost of the dialogue between social partners. Work time reduction was consummate on two levels. Before Aubrey II, company-level agreements were predominant, while after year 2000 branch-level agreements became more common.OutcomesThe in beginning much discussed and controversial legislation has survived. Though when the Left gave over to the Right government in 2002, the extension for small firms be after in that year was blocked. Furthermore, certain adjustments give care extension of the allowable overtime have been adopted.Various studies about the implementation of the laws, inter alia conducted by the ministerial Office of Employment and Solidarity (completed mainly between 1998 and 1999), provided following results (Neumann, 2004)On the employee side, within a year on the first law, in 69 of the one hundred eighty bargaining sectors, at least one of the representative national union has signed framework agreements covering 8.3 million workersAbout 300.000 new job s (out of 1,65 mio) were created which were appoint to the relaxation of the social costs and the reduction of working hours of the lawBy the implication of the legislation in September 2002, almost half of the employed people were influenced by the Aubrey lawCritical evaluationThe significance of the Audrey Laws does not lie in the actual reduction in the working time. Its incumbrance are the wide-ranging consequences on the employment relations in France. For the Jospin government the law provided an opportunity to try to use the basic sympathy of the French electorate with the idea of shorter working hours to encourage the organised decentralisation of collective bargaining (Traxler 1994, p. 184-86). The laws abolished many constraints on temporal flexibility and shifted the emphasis of collective bargaining towards the company-level. Some of the various advantages provided by the Aubrey law affect collective bargaining and work reorganisation.The company-level collective barga ining was influenced tremendously by the legislation. While after 1998 the rate of agreements signed increased by estimated 15,000 per year, after 1999, when the law became mandatory, agreements number increased by 35,000 a year (Howell, 2006).The financial incentives provided by the Aubrey laws were attached the condition to agree on work time reduction by a collective bargaining. Consequently, this collective agreement offered more options and flexibility for work time reduction to the firms, thus leading to work reorganisation. Many experiments which were made in this area including recalculation of the work time, work shift, and adoption to the market requirements, proved to be advantageous for some companies. Additionally, annualisation became very popular supplying companies with terrible flexibility in the work time reductions.Despite these advantages the Aubrey laws was met with mingled feelings from the social actors. The legislation was considered an attack on entrepreneu rs, a triumph of ideology over reason, and even economic suicide (Hayden, 2006). Still, with the change of the government in 2002 the legislation has not been abolished, although it experienced substantial criticism. Instead, the Right provided more relaxation and greater flexibility introduced by the Fillon Laws 2003 and 2004 indicating that the effects of the Aubrey laws were less harmful than illustrated by critics. On the contrary, a study conducted by IMF in November 2006 (Estevo and S, 2006), indicated that the legislation appeared to have a rather negative effect as it failed to create more jobs and negatively influenced employers and employees as they tried to neutralise the laws effect on hours of work and monthly wages.The major concerns were raised by the employers. CNPF became MEDEF in October 1998 under the force per unit area from French firms for a more aggressive political position (Jefferys, 2000). virtuoso year later, in October 1999, a protest with 25000 people a gainst the second law followed. In November, MEDEF threatened to pull out of the bipartite national unemployment benefit scheme if the government make use of UNEDIC (Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour lemploi dans lindustrie et le commerce) the National Union Interprofessional for Employment in Industry and Trade agency of the French government which provided unemployed people with social benefits, to subsidise state incentives to reduce working time (Jefferys, 2000). Additionally, by creating a financial disincentive in case of overtime, the 35-hour-week legislation forced employers to undergo a more primitive reorganisation of work (Howell, 2006).From the employees perspective, the law could be viewed ambiguously as a liberator and job creator or as a mechanism for introducing unsocial work schedules (Bouffartigue, 1997, p. 256). Tensions on the company-level were illustrated for instance by the Peugeot-Citroen strikes, when the Saturday was introduced as a compulsory w orking day. Additionally, concerns arose about the decrease in wage level, although employees were promised to not be disadvantaged regarding income reductions which was supported by the unions slogan 35 hours pays 39 (Estevo and S, 2006).The question about the representativeness of those who signed the agreement also forms a part of criticism of the legislation. As mentioned several times, the mandating process can be used by all firms with a lack of union representativeness. The mandating process prevailed in the company-levels agreements (70% in 2001), predominantly by smaller companies (Howell, 2006). Nevertheless, this process failed to recruit more members to unions.Finally, the Aubrey laws can be considered to be an oxymoron. In times of globalization and extensive pressures on firms to stay competitive, France is trying to improve its competitiveness and decrease unemployment by reducing the working time. The work-sharing logic did not fit in this time when the unemployment rate amounted to nearly 10 percent and an average full-time working week was almost 43 hours (INSEE, 2010). There arises the question what the government could have done better. After considering the development of the employment relations in France, the trend of decentralisation should be pursued more constantly. State intervention should be reduced to give the social partners the possibility to develop and implement own methods for the work time reduction as the legislation did not match appropriately the needs of all French companies. Especially, the smaller companies who suffered from the law and feared to lose their competitiveness, should be better integrated and left more power and flexibility to adopt the legislation. Therefore, although the employers were gradually given more flexibility it still was embedded in frameworks which convey an impression of regulated deregulation once again demonstrating the predominant position of the French state.Other Major TrendsCollective Bargaining ReformOne of the significant changes to the industrial relations system took place in 2004 with the implementation of the Fillon law. The law brought two major changes into collective bargaining. The favourability principle (principe de faveur), where agreements from lower and higher levels may deviate from each other if it more advantageous for the employees concerned, was relaxed for certain cases (e.g. working time) (OECD, 2005). The favourability principle has been retained for minimum wages, job classifications, supplementary social protection measures and multi-company and cross-sector vocational training funds (EIRR, 2006). The other change concerned the approval of agreements. Hitherto, an agreement has been valid even if it had been signed by only one trade union with representative status. The new law widened the scope of the majority principle, the application of which depends on the level of negotiations.Individual Right to Training in FranceIn September 2003 a national cross-sectoral agreement on employees lifelong access to training was concluded, approve by all five representative unions (Vincent, 2003). The law promotes individual training rights for employees while putting its focus on sectoral negotiations.Labour Market modernizationIn January 2008, a step towards French flexicurity has been made by the agreement on the modernisation of the labour market. It provides more flexibility on issues like recruitment and termination of employment at the same time maintaining certain employee rights in term of termination (Lefresne, 2008).ConclusionIn conclusion, employment relation in France can be described as developing towards decentralisation and more flexibility to the advantage of business and labour. Although, the state is taking distance from intervention in the economy, it remains the predominant character in the regulation of social relations.